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A Critique of John McNeill, S. J. and
Gregory Baum, o. S. A. on the
Subiect of Homosexuality
John F. Harvey, O.S.F.S.
You may wonder why I have
chosen to treat only two writers
on the subject of homosexuality.
It is my experience that John J .
McNeill, S.J. and Gregory Baum,
O.S.A. are regarded by gay Catholics as offering an alternative
theology to that of the Church on
the question of homosexuality.

Father Harvey is president of
De Sales Hall School of TheOlogy
in H yattsville, Md. H e teaches
courses in pastoral-moral theology
in the Cluster of Independent
Theological Schools in metropolitan Washington. Father Harvey
is a fr eq uent contributor to Linacre.
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Going beyond the position of
Charles Curran, who seeks to
justify faithful homosexual unions
by his principle of compromise,
McNeill and Baum do not consider homosexual actions wrong in
themselves. It is not surprising,
then, that Dignity, a national organization of gay Catholics affirming that "gays can express
their sexuality in a manner that is
consonant with Christ's teaching"
makes frequent use of two statements of McNeill and Baum. The
first, " The Homosexual and the
Church," is an excerpt from the
keynote address McNeill delivered at the first national convention Dignity held in September, 1973 (National Catholic Reporter, October 5, 1973, 7-8, 1314). The second statement by
Gregory Baum, "Catholic Homosexuals," appeared in Co mmonweal, February 15, 1974, 8-11.
Let me first describe McNeill's
position.
McNeill's m a j 0 l' arguments
treat (1) the various texts in Holy
Scripture concerning homosexuality and conclude that none of
the texts contains a clear condemnation of faithful homosexual
union; (2) he also affirms that
man's radical freedom enters into
the formation of man's sexual
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orientation in such a way that
biological givens, such as the sex
in which one is born, should not
be determinative of sexual activity. First, let us consider McNeill's use of Scripture.
(1) Cautioning that the Scriptures are historically and culturally limited, McNeill makes reference to the Genesis account of the
creation of male and female. He
cites the traditional view that
genital human sexuality derives
its meaning exclusively in terms
of the relationship of male and
female in a procreative union.
Then he questions whether this
traditional view is really an expression of God's will, or merely
the reflection of the needs of the
primitive human community. He
suggests that with some theologians we should read Genesis
with a new perspective: The
Genesis account of the origin of
man and woman and marriage is a
myth, expressing an ideal for the
future rather than an event of the
past.
"The Garden of Eden in which
man found himself perfectly at one
with himself and his sexuality, his
fellow man, nature, and God represents primitive man's primordial
dream of what ought to be in the
future which he projected into the
past as a state he once possessed
and lost and now must work to regain. From this perspective ideal
human sexual relationships are not
to be sought in the past, but must
be created for the future. And the
key to that future is man's ideal
human nature which represents not
so much a static given from the past
but a dynamic ideal process of
growth and development." (p. 7)
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(2) McNeill believes that the
Genesis account represents various aspects of the then monogamous agrarian family unit. (a)
It reflects the need of a paternalistic society to reflect male superiority; (b) like other accounts
of sexuality in Old Testament and
New, itis fearful of Canaanite and
other idolatrous sexual practices.
Turning to the Code of Leviticus
condemn a tions of homosexual
acts, McNeill sees it as an expression of the Jewish horror of the
meaning of sodomy, namely, it
was the common practice in the
Middle East to submit a captured
foe to sodomy. (Homosexual activity then was an expression of
domination, contempt and scorn.)
The Jewish male population undoubtedly suffered this indignation, and because the dignity of
the male was of prime importance
to this society, it would follow
that "any activity necessarily associated with the degradation of
the male was a serious offense,"l
McNeill fin d s problematical
"that what is referred to in Scripture as homosexuality is either
not the same reality at all, or that
the Biblical authors did not manifest the same understanding of
that reality as we have it today.
Therefore it can be seriously
questioned whether what is understood today as the true homosexual and his activity is ever the
object of explicit moral condemnation in the scriptures."
After all, McNeill continues,
biblical writers were not familiar
with the distinction bet wee n
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homosexual 0 ri en t a ti 0 nand
homosexual activity, and could
not have reasoned to the conclusion that a homosexually oriented
person should be allowed to engage in homosexual activity. For
this reason, even in the one passage which McNeill finds in the
New Testament (Romans 1:2627) as referring clearly to homosexual activity, he sees no conde m nat ion of contemporary
homosexual unions. He believes
Paul understood the Greeks who
indulged in homosexual activity
to be heterosexuals involved in
homosexual activities, probably
forms of the sacred prostitution
so often condemned III the Old
Testament.
From his study of biblical
scholars on human sexuality McNeill concludes that the primary
message of the Old Testament is
that "love, including sexual love,
requires respect for the other person as well." The sin which man
can commit in his sexual conduct
with another consists in dishonoring the person of a fellow human
being. In the N,ew Testament the
writers teach the need to integrate sexual powers into one's total personality within the context
of free, interpersonal love.
Author's Critique

Critique: While I believe that
the Scriptures are not the only
source of our teaching on homosexuality, they are important for
our understanding of sexuality in
general and homosexuality in particular. McNeill's use of Scripture
presents many difficulties. Were
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one to grant for the sake of the
argument that the Genesis account was an ideal representation
of a future condition, an ideal to
be striven for, it is significant that
the biblical account is concerned
with the man-woman relationship. The G en e sis accounts
(chapters 2, 3) have been regarded as both an ideal and norm of
sexual behavior, and the sexual
behavior is heterosexual. Matthew's reference to this norm
(Matthew 19: 1-9) strengthens
the argument that Genesis taught
a heterosexual norm of sexuality
in permanent marriage. The author of Matthew quotes both
Genesis 1:27 and 2:24: (Jesus)
answered: "Have you not read
that the creator from the beginning made them male and female ,
and that he said: This is why a
man must leave father and mother, and cling to his wife, and the
two become one body? They are
no longer two therefore, but one
body. So then what God has
united, man must not divide."
(J erusalem Bible translation)
Again, in the Genesis accounts
it is said that man was created as
male and female (Genesis 1:27)
and that it was not good that
man should be alone. At this
point, however, God did not create another man but a woman.
Surely, the Genesis account says
something about the complementary nature of man and woman. 2
Another argument used by McNeill throughout his discussion of
scriptural references is that sexual norms are determined exclu167

sively by cultural factors: Jewish
and Christian marriages were
structured to assure male domination. Homosexual acts were
condemned, because they were
forms of prostitution rites, or
painful reminders of humiliation
by the captors of the Israelites.
And so forth. It can be argued
against this kind of speculation
that the authors of the sacred
books, beginning with the Genesis
account of marriage, intended to
affirm c e r t a i n transcendental
principles concerning human sexuality and marriage. If this were
not so, how could the author of
Matthew, 19, 1-9, refer back to
the pristine integrity of marriage?
On another occasion why 'would
Jesus say that divorce was not
prevalent in the beginning, but
was a concession due to the hardness of men's hearts? (Mark
10: 2-12.)
This is not to say that everything which is said about sexuality in the Old Testament is of
permanent value. One recognizes
the prescriptions of Leviticus
(15: 19-30) concerning the menstruating woman as a purely cultural determinant. In accepting
the cultural milieu of Genesis and
other books of the Bible we do
not deny that they also contain
certain perennial principles, such
as the norm of heterosexual marriage.
It would be a mistake to demonstrate the heterosexual norm
of marriage from individual texts
when the context of both the Old
Testament and the New stress
the complementary relationship
168

of man and woman. 3 Nowhere in
Holy Scripture is the homosexual
person condemned, but always the
action is condemned. Nowhere is
there any approval of homosexual
unions, but the heterosexual union of man and wife is confirmed
from Genesis to Ephesians as a
perennial principle. While Holy
Scripture does not say the last
word about homosexuality, it
gives no support to such actions.
As already mentioned, McNeill
interprets all the specific texts referring to homosexual activity in
terms of a relationship to prostitution cults. Prescinding from the
Leviticus texts in the Old Testament, and the other references in
the New, one wonders how one
can prove that in Romans 1:26-27
homosexual acts were condemned
only because they happened in
the background of deliberate repudiation of God, or because it
happened to be Greek heterosexuals performing homosexual activities. He draws the conclusion
that the men were heterosexuals
because of the active aorist participle, aphentes, men giving up
their natural relations with women. He does not explain St. Paul's
reference to women making use
of other women. This is hardly a
convincing proof. Really, McNeill
cannot have it both ways. In one
place he argues that biblical authors condemn homosexual actions, because of their association
with sacred prostitution rites,
while they do not condemn the
interior disposition toward homosexuality; but, on the other hand,
McN eill argues on the basis of a
Linacre Quarterly

grammatical phrase (aphentes)
that Paul was condemning heterosexual Greeks performing homosexual actions. It has been assumed by McNeill that biblical
authors knew nothing about the
interior dispositions of the homosexual.
In summing up his understanding of Scripture and homosexuality McNeill asserts correctly the
primacy of love in both Testaments, and hence the need for
mutual respect. But his attempt
to show that a faithful homosexual couple fulfills these ideals
of Scripture is weak in the absence of any supporting scriptural
texts dealing with the matter at
hand.
Personal Uniqueness
(2) In his treatment of human
nature and human freedom, McNeill stresses that every individual is more than the species, and
that each human being has a personal uniqueness. If a loving action takes the form of a sexual
gesture it must be directed to the
other person as unique, and as an
end in himself or herself. Too
much emphasis on procreation
can lead to a dehumanizing form
of sexuality. As he puts it, "There
is something more to the question
of the moral quality of sexual behavior than purely the objective
legal question of marriage or the
objective rational question of
ope nne s s to procreation-that
something else is -love."
McNeill posits that human sexuality, like all human reality, participates "in the radical freedom
August, 1976

of man" precisely because it is
human.
Many theologians ignore the
fact that sexuality is not a totally
instinctive determined phenomenon. Human freedom, however,
cannot receive its total explanation in terms of causal determinacy, but only in terms of ideal
goals and purposes. Since man
can project ideal goals, man can
allow these goals to be the ultimate determining factor in his behavior.
He goes on to argue that man
can use his bodily organs in many
creative ways. He uses his mouth,
which is obviously intended for
eating, in order to communicate
his innermost sentiments; likewise, he can use his sexual organs,
designed by nature for procreation, in order to give the most
intimate personal expression of
his drive for union in love with a
fellow human. The point is that
man has the freedom to decide
how he will use his powers.
McNeill explains how man's
freedom enters into the formation
of his sexual orientation. Biological givens (one's physical sexuality) do not determine human
behavior precisely as it exists on
the human level. What we are in
our society, or in any other society, is a free cultural creation.
For each culture creates its own
ideal identity images from the
masculine and feminine roles.
That is-why the young undergo a
process through which they adapt
themselves to the prevailing cultural images and expectations,
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which are in agreement with their
biological identity. Although in
the past theologians have mistakenly identified such cultural
images as divine givens, in more
recent times they have been able
to identify such images as determined purely by particular cultures.
In this context Jesus is seen
as the great liberator from sexual
taboos. (McNeill does not identify these taboos, nor does he show
how Jesus liberates us from
them.) He concludes that the
sexual identity images which concretize heterosexual relationships
at any point in human history are
human creations; and that any
effort to insist that they come
forth from God's will is to raise a
human creation to the level of
idolatry. Theologians then should
make a critical investigation of
sexual identity images. If they do
so, they will discover that as a
result of our identifying with the
heterosexual identity images, we
have accepted as the form of
heterosexual relationships that of
the master-slave, in which the
male seeks to dominate, and the
female seeks to be dominated.
Such a relationship is contrary
to ideal Christian love, which can
exist only if both persons see
themselves as equals. The primary goal, then, of human sexual
development is that "we should
fashion cultural identity images
that make it possible for human
beings to achieve the fullness of a
true personal relationship in the
process of conforming to the
images provided by society."

170

According to McNeill, then,
ideal human nature lies in the future, and to the development of
this ideal man must be directed: a
free, mature person living in a mature, interpersonal community.
Then a homosexual relationship
will be viewed as a truly constructive and mature expression of human love.
Following Gustav Jung's analysis of positive traits in the homosexual, McNeill concludes:
"Each of the specia l qualities
Jung attributes to the homosexual
community is usually considered as
a striking characteristic of Christthe qualities which distinguished
him from the ordinary man. The
ability to meet the individual as a
person apart from stereotypes and
cultural prejudices. the refusal to
establish his identity a nd accomplish his mission by means of violence. the image of himself as the
loving servant of all humanity."

McNeill asks that we be prepared to meet every individual
person on his or her own merits
without allowing ourselves to be
blinded by stereotypes. The tendency of both heterosexuals and
homosexuals to define themselves
in contrast to one another leads
to a "narrow and impoverished
self-image for both parties." Man
should be free to develop all the
qualities belonging to the fullness
of person.
McNeill's Concept of Freedom
Critique of McNeill: To understand McNeill one needs to examine his concept of freedom,
which he derives from Blondel. In
several other articles 4 he contrasts
Linacre Quarterly

the traditional notion of freedom
with that of Blondel. In the traditional concept man exists and
then he acts. "All actions are considered as functions which can
only influence that unchanging
reality on the phenomenal or accidental level of substantial determination."s In the Blondelian
conception, however, man's freedom must be understood beyond
all particular actions as the radical self-positing of his own reality.
Man must exist at every moment as a consequence of his freedom. "If in the depths of his own
subjective being man meets with
any determinism wha tsoeverbiological, psychological, social, or
even a determinism springing
from the divine will, a determinism which lies radically outside
his free ability to determine himself-then one must be forced to
accept the conclusion that the existence of an individual human
being as such is an illusion.""
The law is within us, and we cannot escape it, whether we conform to it freely or oppose it
freely.
McNeill accepts as a first principle of moral activity Blondel's
understanding of freedom, which
he quotes: "There is no being
where there is only constraint. If
I am not that which I will to be I
am not. At the very core of my
being there is a will and a love of
being or there is nothing. If man's
freedom is real, it is necesssary
that one has at present or at least
in the future a knowledge and a
will sufficient never to suffer any
tyranny whatsoever."7
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McNeill logically accepts the
Blondelian principle of immanence:
"Nothing can impose itself on a
man, nothing can demand the assent of his intellect or the consent
of his will, which does not in some
way find its source in m a n him-

self."7a
Thus, accepting these premises,
McNeill draws the conclusion
that whatever we are as men in
this present society is a free cultural creation. In the circumstances of his life and culture man
creates his own freedom. At the
same time McNeill admits the
strong cultural influences which
shape a child from earliest years.
He also acknowledges that his
freedom is "dependent upon a
transcendent truth, to which it
must conform and is directed to
values which, far from being his
exclusive creation serve him as
guide, norm, and sanction."R Referring to Blondel, he resolves the
relationship between transcendence and immanence by the philosophy of action:
"Action h as its own a priori structure from which the totality of
thought derives its meaning and
structure. . . . Accordingly, he
changed the centra l structure of
philosophy from thought as analytic
to action as synthetic. . . . His
search for mora l principles is therefore an endeavor to discover the
all-encompassing dialectical I a w
that immanently governs the evolution of huma n life."9

One exercises his freedom by
responding to ideals, which are
not imposed from without, but
arise within consciousness:
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"The m e taphysi cal order is not
outside the will as a n extraneous
end to be a t tained , but is conta ined
within the will as a means to move
beyond. It does not represent a
truth already cons tituted in fac t,
but prese nts to thought what on e
wishes to will, tha t is, a n idea l object .. . . M a n is the reby free from
a ll predeterminism. "10

In free action one synthesizes
the real and the ideal, and thereby discovers his moral principles.
A communion with God is possible through union with Jesus
Christ. Man can make a free commitment to both God and fellowman.11
Once one has grasped McNeill's
acceptance of Blondel's thought,
he can see why McNeill rejects
the traditional position of the
Church on objective standards of
morality_ Any sexual action by a
loving person is a unique action
not measurable by any extrinsic
norm. Sharing in the radical freedom of man, this action derives
its morality from the ideals which
arise within the will of the person
himself. Thus, as long as a sexual
act is free, loving, and creative, it
is good; the biological and instinctive elements of the sexual
act determine in no way its moral
goodness or evil.
McNeill, then, holds that all
moral authority comes from within the person himself as he reaches
out to grasp transcendental truth.
This presupposes a process of
growth in the person in all areas
of development including the sexual. In the homosexual, according
to McNeill, it often begins with
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promiscuous sex and advances
over a long period of time to a
mature, loving relationship, which
is characterized by love and trust_
Implicitly, contrary to his own
theory of freedom, however, McNeill presupposes that the homosexual has been determined in his
orientation toward his own sex
by myriad influences in early life.
He regards this learned inclination as connatural to him; and so
he seeks the same kind of fidelity
from his chosen beloved as man
and woman should do in marriage. Just as sexual intimacy between two heterosexual persons is
considered as an expression of
union, so sexual actions between
two homosexual lovers is meant to
be an expression of 'their committed love.
In contrast to traditional Christian teaching McNeill makes the
homosexual union the alternative
to marriage. It is meant only for
those homosexually oriented. It
presupposes an earlier experi mental period (promiscuity) followed by faithful union. Apart
from Roman Catholic teaching on
marriage, the homosexual com munity by and large does not accept even the ideal of faithful
homosexual union .
Summary of Gregory Baum_
COlllmonweal, February 15, 1974,

8-11.
Baum contends that the Catholic theologian has become suspicious of the old arguments
about human nature. Perhaps
what a particular culture calls
Linacre Quarterly

"human nature" is merely the
self-understanding of the dominant class; and the perpetuation
of that self-understanding tends
to extend the power of the class.
For this reason, "the theologian
must try to discern in the inherited, historically constituted human nature the possible structures of oppression, legitimating
various forms of what Hegel has
called master-slave relationships."
(p. 9)

Baum speaks of God's judgment enabling him to discern the
structures of evil in this world.
This judgment rests upon man's
historically constituted nature,
which appears to be mutuality:
"What is normative for normal
life is the human nature to which
we are divinely summoned, which
is defined in terms of mutuality.
This, at least, is the promise of
biblical religion ." (p. 9) Further
in the article Baum describes mutuality as friendship. He sets
down a new norm by which to
evaluate the morality of homosexual relationships, namely, mutuality. This means that a homosexual relationship is good if it
grounds a friendship which "enables the partners to grow and to
become more truly human. . . .
For the structure of redeemed life
is mutuality." (p. 10)
Baum realizes that there are
damaged forms of sexuality which
do not admit of mutuality: sadism, masochism, and paedophilia.
They do not fulfill the ideal of
mutuality to which God summons
us. While recognizing that some
August, 1976

psychiatrists and psychologists do
not believe that a homosexual relationship can fulfill the norm of
mutuality, Baum holds that theologians should take seriously" the
witness of homosexual men and
women who have struggled for
self-knowledge and transcended
the weight society has put on
them and who tell us that their
lives are based on mutuality."
(p. 10) From the specific witness
of Christians and Catholics who
have sustained lasting homosexual relationships the theologian
may draw the conclusion that
constitutive homosexuals "must
accept their orientation and live
accordingly. Homosexual love,
then, is not contrary to the human nature, defined in terms of
mutuality, toward which mankind
is summoned." (p. 10)
Some Unproven Assertions
Before evaluating Baum's position it is profitable to note some
of his unproven assertions. When
he speaks of an historically constituted human nature, he is asserting that human nature at any
given time is constituted exclusively from the elements of a particular culture; he asserts also
that human nature as generally
understood by scholastic philosophy is so entangled with dehumanizing elements which have
been woven into our culture that
it is no longer an operative moral
norm. Yet· the only example he
gives of these dehumanizing elements is the tradition affirming
the superiority of the male, or the
master-slave relationship. He also
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asserts that the long standing tradition against homosexuality is an
example of the cruelty of the
heterosexual culture. The consequence of the hostility of the
majority is the placing of an unspeakable burden on homosexuals. The burden takes the form
of self-hatred. The homosexual
learns to hate himself in the same
way he feels society hates him,
and he becomes full of self-loathing. Theologians, then, should
seek new ground for moral norms,
because the traditional arguments
arise from a cruel culture.
Baum is aware of the distinction between temporary and constitutive homosexuality. He refers
to the former "as a phase to be
passed through" and the latter as
"a constant to be lived with." (p.
10. Italics author's) He is concerned with the question whether the constitutive homosexual
should be allowed to express himself genitally. He is convinced
that such an expression cannot be
proven to be immoral, because the
concept of human nature and the
relationship between man and
woman have become problematic
in the writings of some moral
theologians, who are not specified.
Thus, he seeks a new norm to
evaluate morally homosexual relationships, and he finds it in mutuality, or true friendship.
Author's Critique

Critique of Baum: As already
pointed out, Baum does not prove
sweeping assertions about the
constitution of human nature. He
presupposes that society's at174

titude toward homosexuals is the
major cause of whatever neurosis
the person may have. This is contrary to sound psychiatric opinion. 12 This is not to deny that the
self-hatred found in the homosexual is in part a reflection of
the attitude of hatred found in
society toward the homosexual.
Baum's choice of mutuality as a
norm of human sexuality ignores
other varied and complex aspects
of sexuality, such as procreation
and procreative longing, motherhood, fatherhood, and familystability. He does not treat the
Scriptural teaching on sexuality
or homosexuality. On the basis of
his own understanding of the interplay between human nature
and the prevailing culture, he
chooses the norm of mutuality for
sexual actions. Since his norm is
not comprehensive enough to take
in all the known elements of sexuality, and does not give an account of scriptural teaching, it is
inadequate.
Summary
There are a series of weak
points in both approaches: (1) If
the norm is purely subjective, and
divorced from the history of man,
it will not be able to see the full
reality of man as he has learned
from historical experience. Why
should Baum's perception of morality as mutuality displace more
nuanced norms which take into
account not only man's subjective
condition, but also the structure
of human society, the structure of
human acts, one person in relationship to another person and to
society? (2) On the scriptural
Linacre Quarterly

question Baum does not really
treat it; McNeill interprets the
pertinent passages on the condemnation of homosexuality in
such a way as to render them all
non-applicable to the homosexual
in the faithful union. (3) The
concentration of both McNeill
and Baum on the situation of the
faithful homosexual union is quite
disproportionate when you consider that the vast majority of
homosexuals do not desire and
do not seek this kind of union.
Moral Theology is supposed to
evaluate per se situations more
than it does per accidens problems. Granted theologians consider both kinds, but more attention should be given to the typical
behavior of the typical homosexual. (4) In psychiatry the idea of
the constitutive homosexual, that
is to say, the person who is permanently oriented in this direction is not universally accepted. 13
It is premature to say that there
is very little hope that future
study will not reveal ways of helping some homosexuals to change
the direction of their sexual instincts. (5) No consideration is
given to the alternative life style
of perpetual continence, motivated by the love of God, and expressed in service to neighbor.
There are many other problems
in this phenomenon which demand research-problems both in
psychology and in morality. We
need the patience to probe them.
Appendix to Critique of
McNeill and Baum
Since completion of my critique
of McNeill and Baum the Sacred
August, 1976

Congregation for the Doctrine of
the Faith has issued its "Declaration on Certain Questions Concerning Sexual Ethics" (January
1976) in which Church teaching
concerning the morality of homosexual actions is reaffirmed. Reaffirmed, however, within a pastoral
context, which exhorts pastors to
treat homosexuals with understanding, helping them to overcome difficulties and to relate to
both heterosexuals and homosexuals. As is usually the case when
the Church issues a statement on
sexual ethics, it is roundly denounced by some secular and religious writers, and, at the same
time, it is applauded in other sectors of the Catholic press, particularly L'Osservatore Romano. 14
Rather than to review these publications I prefer to comment
briefly on that part of the Declaration which considers homosexuality. (paragraph 8)
Significantly, the Declaration
does not pose as an authority on
the different kinds of homosexuals, but merely summarizes contemporary psychological thought.
I t follows a distinction commonly
accepted, namely, that between
transitory and apparently irreversible homosexual tendencies.
It is on the latter form, so-called
incurable or constitutional homosexuality, that the Declaration
comments. People in this second
category tend to conclude that
their condition is so natural that
faithful homosexual relationships,
analogous to marriage, are justified as the only way of escaping a
175

solitary life. The Declaration
shows understanding of this feeling in homosexuals, but does not
justify even the so-called faithful
union. Homosexual :actions lack
"an · essential and indispensable
finality," .i.e., they fail to signify
both the unitive and procreational
meanings of genital acts-meanings which are inherent in the
acts, apart from the intentions of
the participants. " ... Homosexual acts are intrinsically disordered." So much for the basic
content of this paragraph. Now
some personal reflections:
1. The Declaration says that
the culpability of homosexual actions should be judged by the rule
of prudence, which in this context indicates that imputability
under stress is diminished considerably. In no way does it imply
that homosexuals are not sufficiently free to be responsible for
their actions, but, on the contrary, presupposes that there are
ways of helping the homosexual
to increase the degree of freedom
and to reduce the degree of compulsion. ls
2. The Declaration avoids any
attempt at complete analysis of
the causes of homosexuality, temporary or permanent, because we
simply do not know them. Unfortunately, however, it seems to
adopt the notion that some homosexuals are set in this direction
because of "some kind of innate
instinct."1 6 While the beginnings
of homosexuality are seen to be in
very early childhood-at least
this seems to be the growing opinion-the tendency itself is not re-
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garded as innateY Far more than
instinct, moreover, seems to be involved in the formation of permanent homosexual tendencies. I R
Even the adjective permanent
must not be taken in any absolute sense. Again, the Declaration's reference to "pathological
constitution" is infelicitous. Advocates of faithful homosexual
unions will argue from such
phraseology to the conclusion
that one has no choice but to express "innate instinct" in the
most acceptable love relationship
possible.1 9
3. They would also add that the
majority of the members of the
American Psychiatric Association
have voted to remove homosexuality from the categories of psychosis and neurosis, and therefore
do not regard the condition as
pathological. Some recognition of
the debate which preceded and
followed the vote would have
avoided the impression that the
authors of the Declaration were
not aware of current psychological thinking. Terms like "seriously disordered" and "intrinsically
disordered" should not be confused by the unwary reader with
psychological language like "innate instinct" and "pathological
constitution." Intrinsic disorder
is an ethical term, meaning that
something is lacking in one of
man's basic relationships to God
or to other men; pathological constitution, however, is a presupposition in psychological theory that
a person inherits serious disorientations in cognitive or emotional patterns.
Linacre Quarterly

3. Concerning the use of Scripture in the Declaration's paragraph on homosexuality: The authors would have done better to
use the Scriptural teaching on
marriage, particularly as it is expressed in Genesis, 1, 2 and in
Ephesians, 5, 21-33, as its basis
for condemnation of homosexual
acts. Having pursued this line of
argument in other places,2° I will
merely state that the doctrine of
the Church on marriage, as expressed in "The Church in the
Modern World," nn. 47-52, and in
"Humanae Vitae," nn. 7-16, reflect the constant tradition of the
Church against homosexual actions. Just as nowhere in Holy
Scripture are homosexual actions
approved, and, wherever mentioned, condemned, so nowhere in
Church teaching are homosexual
actions approved, and, wherever
mentioned, condemned.
4. In its condemnation of homosexual unions between those who
seem set in their homosexual orientation the Declaration might
have raised the question concerning fidelity. How exclusive a fidelity do homosexual couples
really intend? It would seem that
even the lasting unions involve
the acceptance of a certain
amount of infidelity on the part
of either or both partners. Do
writers who espouse faithful
homosexual unions project into
the minds of so-called faithful
couples an idealism which the homosexuals really do not have?
Again, when does a homosexual
union become "faithful," or what
are the criteria of fidelity?
August, 1976

5. Whether one regards the
chastity of the irreversible homosexual as charismatic or not, it is
a fact made possible by the grace
of God who always gives to man
sufficient grace to fulfill his commands; and, if we accept the authentic teaching of the Church,
chastity is mandatory for the
homosexual, just as it is mandatory for many heterosexuals living in difficult situations as singles, or as divorced. That God
gives sufficient grace to fulfill difficult commands is a doctrine of
faith; however, that He gives
charismata for this or that action
may be open for discussion and
disagreement. 2 1
6. I refer the readers of Linacre
Quarterly to the "Pastoral: Human Sexuality" of Bishop Francis
Mugavero.22 It is written with
gentleness and hope without compromising the teaching of the
Declaration, while stressing the
truth that homosexuals share the
same humanity as heterosexuals,
and should regard themselves,
and be regarded by us, as fully
acceptable to God. On our part,
we need to do more to describe
and to defend the civil rights of
the homosexual.
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